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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellant,

:
:

v.

:

CLARK ROY FRIESEN,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 981540-CA

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals a final order of dismissal in a prosecution for possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996). The information was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the
trial court's order suppressing evidence which rendered the State unable to proceed. See
State v. Troyer, 866 P.2d 528 (Utah 1993). The State's appeal is proper under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (1995 & Supp. 1998). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND PRESERVED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1(a). Did the trial court clearly err infindingthat the only purpose for the traffic
stop was Trooper Wilson's assumption that defendant had violated Wyoming law

requiring the permanent display of both a rear and front plate?
1(b). If so, did the trial court further err in concluding that the trooper therefore
lacked reasonable suspicion to effect the stop?
A "bifurcated" review standard applies to these issues. The trial court's underlying
fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The trial
court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some
"measure of discretion" as regards the application of legal standards to the facts. See
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994).
These issues were preserved below (R. 47-41; R. 50-48; R. 61-59; R. 62).*
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996) (R. 2-1).
Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search of his

*The record is numbered in reverse chronological order.
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vehicle (R. 20-29 (motion); R. 32-22 (memorandum) R. 58-51 (reply memorandum)
(copies are contained in addendum A). Following an evidentiary hearing held on 26
February 1998 (R. 75) (a copy of the suppression hearing transcript is contained in
addendum C), the trial court granted defendant's motion (R. 50-48) (a copy of the
Memorandum Decision is contained in addendum D). The State moved to reconsider the
suppression ruling (R. 61-60) (a copy of the motion is contained in addendum B), but the
trial court denied the State's motion (R. 62) (a copy of the Memorandum Decision is
contained in addendum D). Because the State was unable to proceed without the
suppressed evidence, the trial court dismissed with prejudice the above charge (R. 68-67).
The State filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 70).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Suspicion of a Registration Violation and/or Stolen Vehicle
On 20 October 1997, Trooper Wilson of the Utah Highway Patrol observed
defendant's vehicle traveling northbound on 1-15 with no front license plate (R. 75: 3-4),
add. C.2 Suspecting a registration violation and/or a possible stolen vehicle the trooper
effected a traffic stop and in the process observed a Wyoming license plate on the rear of

2

Only the first page of the suppression hearing transcript is numbered in the record
on appeal and its subsequent pages retain their original numbering. Therefore, transcript
pages will be cited in this brief as "(R. [record number]: [internal page number]).'1
3

defendant's vehicle3 (R. 75: 3-4, 20, 26-27), add. C. In the trooper's experience, a license
plate irregularity such as a missing front plate can indicate improper registration and/or a
stolen vehicle; therefore, the presence of a rear license plate did not allay the trooper's
suspicions (R. 75: 24), add. C.
Suspicion of Drug Trafficking
As the trooper spoke with defendant, the driver, the trooper saw the front license
plate resting on the dash of the car and detected an odor of marijuana coming from the
open driver's side window (R. 75: 5-6), add. C. He also noticed a sprig of sage or juniper
hanging on the rear view mirror (id). In the trooper's experience, sage and juniper are
commonly used to mask the smell of the marijuana (id).
For safety purposes, the trooper asked defendant to exit the car and accompany
him back to the patrol vehicle (R. 75: 7), add. C. There, defendant provided a valid
driver's license and vehicle registration (R. 75: 9), add. C.4 The trooper told defendant
that because he was from out-of-state, the trooper would issue a warning for the improper

3

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-404 (1993) ("License plates issued for a vehicle
other than a motorcycle, trailer, or semitrailer shall be attached to the vehicle, one in the
front and the other in the rear"); Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1305(5) (1993) ("It is a class C
misdemeanor to operate upon any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to be
registered without having the license plate or plates securely attached . . . " ) .
4

Neither defendant nor his passenger codefendant Sultan were the registered owner
of the car, but codefendant had permission to take the vehicle (R. 75: 8-9).
4

license plate display (R. 75: 7), add. C.5
Consent to Search
The trooper also explained to defendant that he detected the odor of marijuana
coming from the front of the car and requested permission to search that area (R. 75: 8),
add. C. The trooper further explained that if he did not find anything upon searching the
front of the car he would not look in other areas (id). Defendant consented to the
requested search stating, "If you have to" (R. 75: 9), add. C. The trooper finished writing
the warning citation and returned defendant's papers (id).
Trooper Wilson next approached codefendant and informed him that he could
smell marijuana coming from the vehicle and that defendant had given him permission to
check the front seat area (id.). The trooper then asked codefendant if the search was
"okay" with him (id.). Codefendant said, "Yes" (id.).
Marijuana Seed Husks and Packaged Marijuana Found
In searching the front of the car, the trooper found what appeared to be the outer
shell or husk of a marijuana seed on the floor of the passenger side of the car and another
seed husk on the driver's side of the car, between the door frame and seat (R. 75: 10-11),
add. C. Uponfindingthe suspected marijuana seed husks, Trooper Wilson informed

5

The trooper observed that he did not know if defendant "had recently wrecked on
the trip[, b]ut the reason for the license plate being on the dash was the fact that front
plastic bumper where the license plate would be secured was damaged (R. 75: 7-8).
5

defendant and codefendant that he suspected he had found marijuana and that he would
therefore search the rest of the vehicle (R. 75: 11-12), add. C. The trooper then searched
three suitcases in the trunk area, one of which was found to contain approximately 12
pounds of marijuana:
The third bag, which I was told was dirty laundry, the first thing I did is I
pushed on it. It was a very solid bag. It didn't feel like laundry would feel.
I found in it what appears to be marijuana wrapped in clear cellophane. It
was surrounded by detergent or scented dryer sheets.
(R.75: 12), add. C.
Motion to Suppress
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized on three grounds. Specifically,
defendant claimed that the stop was illegal on the ground that out-of-state drivers are not
subject to Utah's Motor Vehicle Act (R. 19, 29-26), add. A, that the faint smell of
marijuana did not justify his detention beyond the traffic purpose of the stop (R. 19, 2524), add. A, and that his consent to search was invalid, and was insufficiently attenuated
from the alleged illegal stop (R. 24-23), add. A.
The State responded that the motor vehicle code did not exempt vehicles licensed
in other jurisdictions and therefore that the trooper reasonably suspected an equipment
violation (R. 45-44) (a copy is contained in addendum B), that the smell of marijuana
constituted at least reasonable suspicion to detain defendant (R. 43), add. B, and that
defendant's consent to search was knowingly and voluntarily given (R. 43-44), add. B.

6

Defendant filed a reply to the State's memorandum, arguing that the traffic stop of
an out-of-state vehicle for a violation of the motor vehicle code violated the Commerce
Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the federal constitution (R. 57, 54),
add. A. According to defendant it was not "practicable or reasonable" to require vehicle's
registered in another state to comply with Utah's requirements regarding rear and front
license plate display (R. 53), add. A. Defendant argued that once the trooper observed the
Wyoming plate on the rear of his vehicle, the traffic stop was unjustified in the absence of
a reasonable suspicion another crime was being committed (R. 52), add. A.
Ruling
The trial court accepted defendant's argument that the initial stop was improper:
In this case, Officer Wilson testified at the preliminary hearing that the only
reason he stopped Defendant was because of the missing front plate. He
admitted that he wasn't sure whether vehicles registered in Wyoming were
required to display front plates. He 'assumed' they were because he had
observed other Wyoming vehicles with front plates. The officer's
'assumption' does not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was
engaged in criminal activity. A number of lawful reasons could have
existed to explain the absence of a front plate - one being Wyoming law
does not require them.
(R. 49), add. D.
In so ruling, the trial court rejected the State's argument that Utah's Motor Vehicle
Code applied to vehicles registered in other jurisdictions but operated on Utah highways:
The State cites Utah Code Annotated § 41-1 A-1305. That section provides
that it is a Class ' C Misdemeanor for any person to 'operate on any
highway of this state any vehicle required by law to be registered without

7

having license plates or plate securely attached.' The State argues that the
Statute does not exempt vehicles licensed in other jurisdictions. Assuming
the State's interpretation of the statute is correct, that does not cure the
officer's 'assumption' of Wyoming's license plate requirement. The officer
noticed Defendant's vehicle was registered in Wyoming before he pulled
him over. At that time, the officer did not know whether Wyoming vehicles
were required to display both front and rear license plates. Clearly, the
officer cannot enforce a law that he merely 'assumed' existed. Officer
Wilson should have discontinued his pursuit of Defendant and allowed him
to proceed without interruption.
(id).
Additionally, the trial court acknowledged that the smell of marijuana "may" have
justified defendant's detention beyond the traffic purpose of the stop, but found that
because the initial stop was invalid, Trooper Wilson lacked grounds to further detain
defendant (R. 48), add. D. Finally, the trial court found that the illegal stop "negate[d]
any subsequent consent to search" (id).
The prosecutor filed a motion to reconsider the ruling based on defendant's
stipulation that Wyoming does in fact require display of both a rear and front license plate
(R. 61-60; R. 59), add. D. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, noting
that defendant's stipulation as to Wyoming law had "no bearing" on its suppression ruling
"since it does not change the fact that the officer assumed and did not know that
Wyoming requires two license plates" (R. 62), add. D.

8

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's factual findings regarding the purpose of the traffic stop are
incomplete and therefore misrepresent Trooper Wilson's uncontradicted testimony. The
trial court overlooked Trooper Wilson's testimony that he believed the missing front
license plate not only violated Wyoming law, but that it was also indicative of an
improperly registered and/or stolen vehicle. The trial court's incomplete factual findings
drove its further erroneous legal conclusion that the traffic stop was improper merely
because Trooper Wilson "assumed," but was not absolutely certain that Wyoming
requires both a rear and front license plate display.
Having found the initial traffic stop invalid, the trial court acknowledged that the
smell of marijuana may have justified defendant's further detention. Indeed, assuming
the validity of the traffic stop, the smell of marijuana and masking agent coming from the
vehicle justify not only defendant's further detention, but the subsequent warrantless
search of the vehicle. An additional ground for upholding the warrantless vehicle search
is defendant's consent. Defendant minimally challenged the voluntariness of his consent
below and the trial court did not address the issue other than to hold the consent was
insufficiently attenuated from the invalid traffic stop. Should the Court therefore agree
with the State that the initial stop was justified, neither the detention nor the consent is
tainted and the case should be remanded for trial on the merits.

9

ARGUMENT
THE TRAFFIC STOP OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS
JUSTIFIED PURSUANT TO TROOPER WILSON'S REASONABLE
SUSPICION OF A REGISTRATION VIOLATION WHICH ALSO
SUGGESTED A POSSIBLE STOLEN VEHICLE
1.

Clearly Erroneous Factual Finding Regarding Purpose of
Traffic Stop

The trial court's factual finding that the only purpose for the traffic stop was the
trooper's assumption that defendant's vehicle was in violation of Wyoming law is clearly
erroneous (see R. 50), add. D. Because an appellant raising issues of fact on appeal must
marshal all the evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and then show that evidence
to be insufficient, State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d
1383 (Utah 1991), the evidence supporting the trial court's clearly erroneous finding is set
forth below.
Trooper Wilson's testimony supports the trial court's finding as far as it goes {see
R. 75: 4, 19-27), add. C. However, in narrowly focusing only on Trooper Wilson's
assumption, based on his experience, that defendant's vehicle was being operated in
violation of Wyoming law, the trial court overlooked the trooper's further testimony that
failing to properly display a front license plate can indicate improper registration and
therefore a potentially unsafe vehicle, or even a stolen vehicle (id.). The trial court's
findings are therefore incorrect, incomplete and misrepresent the totality of Trooper
Wilson's uncontradicted testimony. The trial court obviously accepted the trooper's
10

testimony, having entered no contrary finding. The trial court thus clearly erred in
overlooking evidence that the trooper suspected the vehicle was not properly registered,
or possibly stolen.
2.

Minimal Objective Justification for Traffic Stop

Due to its erroneous finding regarding the purpose for the traffic stop, the trial
court further erred in concluding the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion.
There is reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop if, from the facts and the
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, police would reasonably suspect that criminal
activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664,
667 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 834 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, the
reasonable suspicion standard is "less demanding" than probable cause, requiring only
"'some minimal level of objective justification5" for the stop. United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations and quotations omitted). Accord State v. Menke, 787 P.2d
537, 541 (Utah App. 1990) (reasonable suspicion "must be based on objective facts
suggesting that the individual may be involved in criminal activity"). In evaluating this
minimal objective justification, a court must consider "the totality of the circumstances —
the whole picture." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). As the Supreme
Court notes:
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
11

common-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as
factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law
enforcement officers.
Id. at 418.
Under these established principals, a stop based on reasonable suspicion may serve
not merely to seize criminals, but also to dispel suspicion and prevent criminal activity.
See, e.g., Terry\ 392 U.S. at 22 (limited detentions supported by interest in "effective
crime prevention and detection"); State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989)
(same). Consequently, there remains the very real chance that many such stops will
reveal no criminality. That possibility, however, does not preclude police from
investigating facts that would warrant a person of "reasonable caution" in taking action.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. See also Menke, 787 P.2d at 540-41 (recognizing police "duty to
make observations and investigations to determine whether the law is being violated");
Holmes, 11A P.2d at 508 (same). Moreover, police are "'entitled to assess the facts in
light of their experience.9" Holmes, 11A P.2d at 508 (quoting United States v. BrignoniPonce, All U.S. 873, 885 (1975)). That a suspect's conduct may be consistent with
innocent behavior does not therefore vitiate the reasonable suspicion of an experienced
officer: "To the contrary, where a defendant's conduct is 'conceivably consistent with
innocent... activity,' but is also 'strongly indicative' of criminal activity, [this Court]
will not hesitate to conclude that reasonable suspicion exists." Provo City Corp. v. Spotts,
861 P.2d 437, 440 (Utah App. 1993).
12

Based on his observations of other Wyoming vehicles, Trooper Wilson assumed
but did not know with absolute certainty that Wyoming required both rear and front
license plate display (R. 49), add. D. Based on his, as it turns out, correct assumption (see
R. 59), add. B, the trooper believed the missing front plate indicated improper registration
and/or a stolen vehicle (R. 75: 4, 19-27), add. C. The trooper's correct assumption of
Wyoming law supports the reasonableness of his suspicions about defendant's car.
Indeed, if the trooper had believed that Wyoming law did not require display of a front
license plate, he could not have reasonably suspected, without more, that the missing
plate required further investigation for a possible improper registration and/or stolen
vehicle.
Therefore, based on his familiarity with Wyoming cars displaying both front and
rear license plates, Trooper Wilson had at least a minimal objective justification for the
traffic stop when he observed defendant's vehicle without a front Wyoming plate.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. Moreover, contrary to the trial court's
erroneous reasoning, the trooper's experienced suspicions were not vitiated by any
possible "lawful reason[]" for the missing front plate (R. 49), add. D. See Spotts, 861
P.2d at 440 (recognizing that existence of an innocent explanation does not vitiate
reasonable suspicion).
It is on this ground that the instant case is distinguishable from State v. Baird, 763
P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1988), where the Court invalidated a traffic stop on the ground it
13

was based on nothing more than the trooper's "idle curiosity" about the color of the
sticker on the out-of-state license plate. State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 971 n. 3 (Utah
App. 1992) (distinguishing Baird). Indeed, this case is more like Naisbitt, where the
trooper stopped a vehicle with no license plates to determine if the paper in the back
window was a valid temporary registration permit. Id. Unlike the trooper in Baird who
stopped Baird's vehicle because "something just struck [him] funny about [the sticker],"
Trooper Wilson, like the trooper in Naisbitt, "had a properly articulable basis" for the
traffic stop that went "beyond idle curiosity." 827 P.2d at 971. Indeed, Trooper Wilson
was concerned defendant's vehicle was not properly registered. See State v. Harmon, 910
P.2d 1196, 1203 (Utah 1995) (recognizing "genuine public safety concern[]" presented by
operation of uninsured vehicles). See also People v. Glick, 250 Cal.Rptr. 315, 319 (Cal.
App. 1988) (validating traffic stop for failure to display current registration tag on out-ofstate license plate, recognizing police have a duty to ensure both in-state and out-of-state
vehicles are "fit" for operation and that registration and inspection requirements are
designed to keep dangerous cars off the highways). The trooper was also legitimately
concerned the vehicle may be stolen. See People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, 101 Cal.Rptr. 837, 844 (Cal. 1972) (recognizing that lack of a license plate is
"highly suspicious," that it is a "matter of common knowledge that automobile thieves
often switch license plates from one car to another in order to conceal the identity of the
stolen vehicle," and concluding that police may reasonably suspect vehicle with missing
14

or improperly attached license plates is stolen). See also Mack v. State, 859 P.2d 526,
527 (Tex. App. 1993); People v. Gordon, 561 N.E.2d 1164, 1165 (111. App. 1990), appeal
denied, 567 N.E.2d 336 (111. 1991) (missing front license plate gives rise to suspicion of
stolen vehicle).
The trial court's ruling misapprehends the uncontradicted facts and the pertinent
legal standard. It should therefore be overruled.
3.

Detention Beyond Any Traffic Purpose Justified by Smell
of Marijuana

Assuming the Court agrees that the instant traffic stop was justified, defendant's
detention beyond any traffic purpose of the stop was valid. Indeed, the trial court
correctly acknowledged that if the initial traffic stop was valid, defendant's detention was
further justified by the smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle when Trooper
Wilson first made contact with him (R. 48), add. D. See Naisbitt, 827 P.2d at 972
recognizing that the ,fodor of marijuana gives an officer justification to search a vehicle,
even absent a warrant or some other exception to the warrant requirement, such as
consent'1).6

6

The smell of juniper and sage branches hanging from defendant's rear view
mirror also emanated from the vehicle, scents which in the trooper's experience are used
to mask the odor of marijuana (R. 75: 6), add. C. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 76
F.3d 1114, 1116-1117 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding detention based in part on strong odor
of air freshener coming from vehicle).
15

4.

Warrantless Vehicle Search Justified Pursuant to Smell of
Marijuana and/or Defendant's Consent

Having found the initial traffic stop invalid, the trial court did not consider the
propriety of the warrantless vehicle search other than to hold any consent was "negate[d]H
by, or insufficiently attenuated from the preceding illegal stop (R. 48), add. D. Thus,
assuming the validity of the initial traffic stop, the warrantless search of defendant's
vehicle was otherwise justified not only by the smell of marijuana and masking agent
coming from the vehicle, Naisbitt, 827 P.2d at 972; Castillo, 76 F.3d at 1116-1117, but
defendant's consent to search as well. Ohio v. Robinette,

U.S.

, 117 S.Ct. 417,

421 (1996); State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 899 P.2d
1231 (Utah 1995).7

7

Defendant minimally challenged the voluntariness of his consent to search below,
focusing instead on the taint from the alleged improper traffic stop (R. 24-23), add. A.
The record indicates Trooper Wilson merely requested permission to search and that he
used no improper claim of authority, show of force, or deception (R. 75: 8-9), add. C. See
State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Defendant and codefendant Sultan
both gave their consent and were otherwise cooperative (R. 75: 8-9), add. C. See
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106. While codefendant Sultan testified that Trooper Wilson
asked defendant for consent to search, but not him (R. 75: 39), add. C, defendant raised
no issue regarding Sultan's testimony below. Therefore, assuming the Court agrees with
the State regarding the validity of the initial traffic stop, there is no need to remand for
findings on the validity of defendant's untainted consent.
16

CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court should reverse the trial court's suppression of
evidence and remand this case for trial.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on [4 January 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

^^kJ^fc^X^__
AN DECKER
ssistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on /^January 1999,1 caused to be mailed, by U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, two accurate copies of this BRIEF OF APPELLANT to:
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN
43 East 200 North
Provo,Utah 84606
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box L
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: (801) 373-4912
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,

:

vs.

: Case No.971400205

CLARK ROY FRIESEN

:
Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr.

Defendant.

:

COMES NOW the defendant, CLARK ROY FRIESEN, by and through his
attorney, and hereby moves this Court for an order suppressing all evidence
obtained by a search of the vehicle operated by the defendant. Defendant was
operating a vehicle which was properly registered in the state of Wyoming. The
1

grounds for the motion are that the officer stopped the vehicle illegally for an
equipment violation to which out of state drivers are not subject to, to wit: no front
plate. Further, the detention of the defendant exceeded that necessary to complete
the traffic stop. Said stop was nothing more that a pretext stop with no legitimate
justification or probable cause and the resulting search was conducted in violation of
the rights of the defendant to befreefromunreasonable search and seizure under the
provisions of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of
Utah.
Further, defendant moves for the suppression of the large quantity of
marijuana found in the bag identified as belonging to the passenger of the vehicle as
there is not sufficient nexus to the defendant to indicate any ownership, dominion or
control over said bag or contents by this defendant.
Based upon the foregoing, defendant requests that this matter be set for
hearing on his motion to suppress prior to the trial of this matter.
Dated this 13,h day of January, 1998.

2

Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I delivered a copy of the foregoing document to the
following:
DAVID O. LEAVITT
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
MILTON HARMON
Attorney for Defendant Sultan
36 South Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
this 13th day of January, 1998.
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MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box L
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: (801) 373-4912
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
:

vs.

:

CLARK ROY FRIESEN

:

Case No.971400205
Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr.

Defendant.

:

COMES NOW the defendant, CLARK ROY FRIESEN, by and through his
attorney, hereby submits this memorandum of points and authorities in support of
his Motion to Suppress.
FACTS
1

The Court heard evidence in this matter previously. At the hearing, Trooper
Charlie Wilson testified that he observed the vehicle, operated by the defendant,
northbound on 1-15, south of Nephi. He could not recall whether he was stationary
or not at the time he saw the vehicle. The trooper noticed that the vehicle did not
have afrontplate displayed. The trooper at some point pulled behind the vehicle
and saw that the vehicle had a rear Wyoming license plate. He pulled the vehicle
over. The trooper was clear that the only reason he stopped the vehicle was that the
vehicle did not display afrontplate. The trooper testified that he knew there were
some states that did not require afrontplate and that he was not sure whether or not
Wyoming required vehicles registered there to display afrontplate. He testified
that he thought Wyoming may have such a requirement since he had seen other
Wyoming cars display bothfrontand rear plates.
The trooper testified that as he approached the vehicle, prior to making
contact with the occupants, he observed the rear plate and noted that the plate was
current. As he approached thefrontof the vehicle he noted damage to the front
bumper and also saw thefrontplate on the dashboard of the vehicle.
2

Upon making contact with the defendant driver, the trooper was furnished a
valid driver's license and vehicle registration. At that time he noticed a sprig of
sage brush or juniper hangingfromthe mirror and detected what he thought might
be the smell of either burnt or raw marijuana. The smell was faint and he was not
positive it was marijuana. He asked the driver back to his patrol car where he
completed checks on the registration of the vehicle and drivers' license.
Upon completing those checks the trooper told the driver he wanted to search*
thefrontof the vehicle. He indicated that the driver was reluctant to give consent
and but eventually said "Yes, if you have to." The officer had the passenger get out
of the vehicle and searched the persons of both defendants for weapons, finding
nothing. The trooper then searched thefrontarea of the vehicle finding two
particles which he identified as marijuana. He then searched the rear of the vehicle
and found marijuana in a bag belonging to the co-defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE INITIAL STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS NOT BASED
UPON A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE OCCUPANTS HAD
COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF UTAH LAW OR A TRAFFIC
3

VIOLATION AND WAS THEREFORE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A police officer may not stop or detain a driver and occupants of a motor
vehicle unless he has reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed a violation
of Utah law. The officer may stop for a minor traffic offense or equipment violation
only for so long as is necessary to complete the purpose of that stop. State v. Lopez,
873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
It is the defendant's position that a violation of the registration requirements
of the state of Utah requiring vehicles registered in Utah to display afrontlicense
plate does not apply to nonresidents. The failure to display afrontplate is not a
factor which would provide "reasonable suspicion" necessary to detain the vehicle
once the officer has determined that the vehicle is registered in another state.
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-201, et. seq., sets forth the requirements for
veliicles operating on the highways of this state and the registration requirements for
said vehicles. Section 41-la-202(2) provides that registration is not required in this
state for any vehicle which is registered in another state and owned by a
nonresident. U.C.A. Section 41-la-401, et. seq., sets forth the requirements of
4

license plates issued to owners of vehicles registered in this state. In Section 41-la404, the location of plates for vehicles registered in this state requires one rear plate
and afrontplate. U.C.A. Section 41-la-1305(5) provides that it is a Class C
misdemeanor for a person to :
operate on any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to be
registered without having license plate or plates securely
attached....(emphasis added)
Defendant maintains that it is not against the law of the state of Utah for the
defendant to operate a vehicle registered in another state without afrontplate.
Defendant submits that, based upon the foregoing, he was not violating any
applicable traffic laws or other laws of this state for which the officer could stop and
detain his vehicle. Once the officer had determined that the vehicle was a
nonresident vehicle, unless he had observed something further upon which he could
justify a "reasonable suspicion" a crime was being committed, his further detention
was unconstitutional. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)
The Utah Court of Appeals considered a similar regarding nonresident
vehicles stopped because the Utah highway patrol trooper claimed the sticker color
5

displayed on the license plate, although showing the current year, had a "peculiar"
color. In State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214 (Ct. App. 1988), Trooper Mangelson of the
Utah Highway Patrol stopped a vehicle registered in Arizona because the sticker on
the rear license plate did not appear to be valid. Although the trooper admitted he
did was unaware of the Arizona color scheme for stickers, he followed the car to
determine if the year was valid. Upon inspection, he determined that the sticker was
valid. After stopping the vehicle the trooper made other observations which
included the smell of marijuana. The court of appeals held that there was no
articulable suspicion to justify the stop and the evidence obtained against the
defendant was a result of the exploitation of the impermissible stop. In Footnote 1
to the opinion of the court, the court stated "If this is sufficient reason to stop, every
out-of-state vehicle may be stopped for no reason other than the officer's ignorance
of the license plate sticker code."
In the present case, Trooper Wilson admitted that some states do not require
a vehicle to display afrontplate, and, although he thought that Wyoming issued
front plates, he did not know whether or not it was required to display afrontplate
6

in Wyoming. (Based upon the facts of this case it is not necessary to address the
issue which would be raised if evidence had been submitted which proved Wyoming
had a requirement that afrontplate be displayed. That factual situation would raise
the issue of a law enforcement officer of one state being able to enforce the
regulatory laws of another state.)
The same unreasonable scenario of a Utah law enforcement officer being able
to stop every out-of-state vehicle which did not display afrontplate would result
from a finding that a violation of Utah's registration and plate display requirements
is justification to stop an out-of-state vehicle.
However, even should the initial stop be considered to be valid until the
trooper determined the plate to be current, the further detention of the defendant
which resulted in the obtaining of additional evidence was unconstitutional. Since
Trooper Wilson admitted that at some point prior to contacting the driver he
ascertained that the vehicle had a proper Wyoming plate, his detentionfromthat
point on was unreasonable and unjustified. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491; State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991); State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446
7

(Utah 1996).
POINT II: THE TROOPER'S SMELLING WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT
BE EITHER BURNT OR RAW MARIJUANA DID NOT JUSTIFY
FURTHER DETENTION UNDER THE "PLAIN SMELL" EXCEPTION.
Defendant also asserts that even should the court determine the stop to be
valid, the further detention and search based upon the smell of marijuana was not
justified. The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, recognized
that the strong smell of marijuana may give probable cause for the search of a
vehicle. The Court cited United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1984,
that a "strong, emanating odor of marijuana comes within the 'plain view' doctrine
and need not be ignored by officers." 744 F.2d at 380. The cases which have
allowed the smell of marijuana to provide the basis of searches have required that
the odor be "strong"(£/.S. v. Hanie, 637 F.2d 227, U.S. v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208
(10th Cir. 1986), "distinct"(£/.S. v. Morin, 949 F.2d 297(10th Cir. 1991), U.S. v.
Merryman, 630 F.2d 780 (10,h Cir. 1980), or "intense and emanating" (U.S. v.
Haley, 669 F.2d 201 (4th Cir.).
The troopers detection of the "possible" smell of either burnt or raw
8

marijuana was not obvious, distinctive, strong, intense, nor did it "emanate" from
the vehicle. The trooper testified that there is a definite difference between the
smell of burnt marijuana and raw marijuana but that he could not discern the
difference in his contact at the door of the vehicle. Defendant submits that the
indication of possible smell of marijuana observed by the officer in this case does
not meet the level necessary to justify probable cause. This conclusion is also
supported by the officer's account of his conduct with the defendant. Instead of
relying upon the smell of marijuana as the basis to search the automobile, the
trooper requested permissionfromthe defendant to search just thefrontof the
vehicle and indicated that the defendant reluctantly, said "If you have to." The
trooper did not testify that he smelled the marijuana stronger once he had his head
clear inside the vehicle.

POINT III: ANY CONSENT GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT FOR THE
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED
FROM THE ILLEGAL DETENTION.
Trooper Wilson testified that after he had the defendant in his patrol car, he
told him he wanted to look in thefrontseat of the vehicle, the defendant hesitated
9

and then said "If you have to." That comment is farfromconsent. The comment is
not agreement to search, but is conditioned upon whether or not the officer had to
search. Since the officer did not have to search, the decision was not that the of
defendant under that comment, but that of the officer. Even if the court were to find
that the statement of the defendant constitutes a consent the consent is not
sufficiently attenuated under the standard of State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah
1990), at 690-91, to wit: temporal proximity of the initial illegality and the consent
in question, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and
flagrancy of the illegal misconduct; there was not sufficient proof of attenuation.
Tliere was no time differential between the initial contact of the defendant with the
trooper or intervening circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant submits that the search of the vehicle
was unconstitutional and all evidence obtained as a result of the search of the
vehicle should be suppressed.
Dated this 13th day of March, 1998.
10

Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document to the
following:
DAVID LEAVITT
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
this/> day of March, 1998.
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MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box L
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: (801) 373-4912

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR JUAB COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

: REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S
: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION

vs.

: Case No.971400205

CLARK ROY FRIESEN

:
Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr.

Defendant.

:

COMES NOW the defendant, CLARK ROY FRIESEN, by and through his
attorney, Michael D. Esplin, and hereby submits this reply to the Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence submitted by the state.
ARGUMENT
1

Defendant stands on the authorities and argument cited in his memorandum
previously submitted on the issues of consent and whether the trooper's smell of
faint marijuana justified reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle and occupants
beyond that necessary to complete a traffic stop. Defendant submits additional
authorities and argument in response to the argument that Utah law enforcement
officers have therightto stop any out-of-state vehicles which violate Utah's
equipment and registration requirements.
Based upon the reasoning upon which the plaintiff relies to justify the
reasonableness of the initial stop in this case, the law enforcement officers of any
state could stop and detain drivers and passengers of vehicles legally registered in
their home states for a number of registration or equipment "violations" of the
officers' state which may not be violations in the home state. Such stops and
detentions violate therightof citizens to travel freely across the country and also
violate the Commerce Clause of the federal constitution. The defendant submits
that the officer did not have therightto stop the vehicle for a registration violation
of nofrontlicense plate.
2

Such laws as those involving conduct such as speed limits, stop signs and
traffic regulatory laws are clearly enforceable by the individual law enforcement
agencies of the state in which a person is traveling. However, registration and
equipment requirements are in a different category. The registration and equipment
regulations concerning motor vehicles have been the individualriglitof each state to
establish for the vehicles registered or licensed in that state. Although the federal
government has imposed federal regulations and requirements concerning areas of
manufacturing to ensure the general safety of motor vehicles, the various states have
therightto enact legislation to amplify the federal regulations. As a result, there are
many areas which may have some safety relevance in which the laws of individual
states may vary. For example, states vary on the requirement to display a front
license plate, the necessity of a license plate light, the amount of tinting allowed in
windows, the size and type of mudflapsand the types of vehicles required to be
equipped with mud flaps, the amount of clearance thefrontand rear bumper must
havefromthe road surface, muffler requirements, etc.
The states have made some effort to standardize motor vehicle safety
3

equipment laws in the areas not preempted by the federal government. Utah has
enacted U.C.A. Section 41-15-1, et. seq., Vehicle Safety Equipment Compact, was
passed by compact states to promote uniformity in safety requirements and
equipment. The reason the law was passed was to ensure that vehicles licensed in
compact states had some uniformity as to safety equipment. The act does not have
any enforcement teeth or penalties. The suggestions of the commission set up by
the act to review and recommend equipment standards can only make suggestions.
The legislatures of those states who are compact members must individually enact
the equipment regulations which they decide are appropriate. Utah law enforcement
officers are not empowered by the act to enforce the laws which other compact
states have adopted even though Utah may have passed similar equipment
requirements.
Many states do not have a requirement that vehicles registered and licensed in
the state display two license plates. The officer indicated that he was aware of that
fact and also that he was not sure whether or not Wyoming required two plates to be
displayed on vehicles licensed there. The issue of the reasonableness of the stop or
4

the very right to impede or delay vehicles which do not comply with a particular
state's registration, licensing or equipment laws has previously been considered and
determined by the United States Supreme Court.
Citizens of this country have a long-standing constitutional right to travel
freely tlirough the different states under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV of the Federal Constitution. See Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall, at 180,19 L
Ed357; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall 418, 20 L Ed 449 (1871); United States v.
Wheeler, 254 US 281 (1920). This protection insures the interstate traveler against
the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement. See Zobel v. Williams, 457
US 55 (1982). The right includes "free ingress" and "egress" tlirough a state.
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 US 385 (1948). Additionally, the application of Utah's
registration requirements to out-of-state vehicles traveling into this state violates the
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. While the various states have
authority to regulate travel into and through the state, they may not place restrictions
or requirements upon vehicles traveling on state roadways which are unreasonable.
In Bibb v. Navaho Freight Lines, 359 US 520,3 L Ed2d 1003 (1959), an
5

Illinois statute requiring mud flaps of a certain type was found to violate the
commerce clause. The court determined that with only two possible exceptions,
states which had mud flap requirements had requirements which would not meet the
requirements of the Illinois statute. This is clearly the situation in regard to the front
license plate requirement of Utah. As set forth above, many states do not have the
requirement of afrontplate.
Although the court found that there were added safety benefits from the type
of mudflaprequired by Illinois, the court felt that the cost and inconvenience to
those traveling in interstate commerce to be more persuasive.
The same argument is applicable to the present case involving the
enforcement of Utah'sfrontlicense plate requirement as enforced on out-of-state
vehicles. It clearly violates the ruling of the court in the Bibb case and for the same
reasons. It is not practicable or reasonable to require compliance by a driver of a
vehicle with the various plate display requirements of each state in which the driver
may pass through. If the vehicle wasfroma state which did not issue afrontplate,

6

the driver of a vehicle registered in that state would be subject to stop in every state
which required it's residents to display afrontplate.
Defendant submits that, based upon the foregoing, he was not violating any
applicable traffic laws or other laws of this state for which the officer could stop and
detain his vehicle. Once the officer had determined that the vehicle was a
nonresident vehicle, unless he had observed something further upon which he could
justify a "reasonable suspicion" a crime was being committed, his further detention
was unconstitutional. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
Based upon the foregoing, defendant submits the stop and detention of the
defendant was not justified and the resulting search was unconstitutional.
Dated this/^day of June, 1998.

Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document to the
7
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following:
DAVID O. LEAVITT
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
this _^Lday of June, 1998.
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David 0. Leavitt, No. 5990
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (435) 623-1141

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. C1lH-j /'JCLC?>
HEATH C. SULTAN
CLARK ROY FRIESEN
Defendants.

The State of Utah hereby submits the following memorandum in opposition to
defendants' Motion to Suppress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Monday, October 20,1997, Trooper Charlie Wilson of the Utah Highway Patrol
stopped the Defendants' vehicle for the violation of nofrontlicense plate. The officer made
contact with the driver. As he did so, he detected a brief odor of marijuana. He also noticed a
small sprig of sage or juniper hanging on the rear view mirror.
The officer had the driver exit the vehicle and he told the driver that he had smelled the

1

faint odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. The officer asked consent to search the front
seat area of the vehicle for marijuana. The driver hesitated, and then said "yes, if you have to."
The officer told the driver that he would just look in thefrontseat area, and that if he didn't find
anything in the immediate area of thefrontseat and floor that he wouldn't check any further.
The driver then said "Go ahead and check, there's no marijuana in there."
The officer informed the passenger that he could smell marijuana coming from the
vehicle. The officer also told the passenger that the driver had consented to a search of the front
of the vehicle and asked him if that was alright with him. The passenger indicated that it was
fine. The officer patted down the occupants and then began searching the front of the car. In the
front floor area, the officer found a smallfragmentof what looked like burnt marijuana.
Additionally, on the floor by the left side of the driver's seat the officer found another small
fragment of what looked like burnt marijuana. Officer Wilson is a trooper with over twenty
years experience and has seen small quantities of marijuana on many occasions.
The officer showed thefragmentof what looked like burnt marijuana residue to the two
occupants, and told them that based on that, he was going to check through the rest of the
vehicle. The officer opened the back of the vehicle and saw three small travel bags. The driver
claimed one, the passenger claimed the other. The third bag bore the name of Defendant Sultan
and was claimed by each Defendant. In the third bag, the officer found twelve pounds of
marijuana.
The officer arrested the Defendants for possession of marijuana with the intent to
2

distribute.

ARGUMENT
1.

THE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP THE VEHICLE.
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-1A-1305 (5) provides that it is a Class "C"

misdemeanor for a person to "operate on any highway of this state any vehicle required by law to
be registered without having license plate or plates securely attached." The defense suggests that
the defendant did not violate the law by not having his front license plate securely attached
because his vehicle was not required to be registered in the State of Utah. The State concedes
that the defendant need not have his car licensed in the State of Utah to drive on the highways of
this state. However, the statute does not exempt vehicle licensed in other jurisdictions to have
their license plates securely attached. The statute states that "any vehicle required by law to be
registered". The phrase "any vehicle required by law" certainly implies that vehicles required by
Wyoming law to be registered or any other state law which fit into the vehicle's regulated by this
statute.
The issue as to whether an out-of-state vehicle is required by 41-la-1305(5) to have a
front plate is resolved by adhering to common rules for statutory construction. The Utah
Supreme Count in Brinkerhoffvs. Forsyth, 79 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah, 1989) stated "where statutory
language is plain and unambiguous, this court will not look beyond the same to define legislative
intent. Rather we are guided by the rule that a statute should generally be construed according to
3

its plain language." The plain language of Section 41-la-1305(5) U.C.A. sets forth that any
vehicle that is required by law. Since the statute does not specifically specify that the vehicle
must be required by Utah law to be registered, this court ought to interpret the statute as meaning
any law which requires a vehicle to be registered. This corresponds with what the Utah Court of
Appeals stated in Allred vs. Utah State Retirement Board, 914 P.2d 1172,1175 (Utah Ct. App.
1996) when it held "unless statutory language is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant
contradiction to the express purpose of the statute, this court applies the statute's literal
wording.*'
Since the defendant was required by Utah law to have afrontplate on his vehicle, the
trooper had reasonable suspicion that a violation of Utah law was occurring when he witnessed
the defendant traveling down thefreewaywithout afrontplate on his trailer.
The defense attempts to compare the incident case to State vs. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214
(App. Ct. 1998). In Baird the Utah Highway patrol trooper stopped the vehicle after determining
that the registration sticker was valid because "something just struck him funny about it". The
Court of Appeals held in Baird that there was no articulable suspicion to justify the stop based on
those facts. The defense attempts to state that Trooper Wilson pulled the vehicle over because he
was unaware of Wyoming'sfrontplate laws. Such is not the case. Trooper Wilson pulled the
defendant over because the defendant was violating Utah law which required that vehicles
registered in Wyoming must havefrontplates in Utah based upon Section 41-la-1305(5) and 41la-404.
4

2. THE TROOPER'S SMELLING THE FAINT SMELL OF MARIJUANA GAVE
HIM REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CONTINUE TO DETENTION TO ASK
CONSENT TO SEARCH.
The State does not assert that the trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle based
upon the faint smell of marijuana. The State believes that if the strong smell of marijuana
emanating from a vehicle falls within the plain view doctrine, thus giving probable cause to
search the vehicle, that a less strong smell of marijuana or a faint smell gives the officer. The
lower standard of reasonable suspicion to continue the detention. The standard for reasonable
suspicion is set forth in State vs. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah, 1995). When the Court stated
"when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to
be engaged in criminal activity." Clearly the faint smell of marijuana gives rise to a reasonable
suspicion that there is marijuana in the car, or that the defendant has smoked marijuana. Under
either scenario, the officer has grounds to ask a few questions regarding that suspicion. For that
reason, the continued detention to ask consent to search of the vehicle is permissible.
3. THE OFFICER RECEIVED CONSENT TO SEARCH,
State vs. Whittenback 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah, 1980) sets forth some of the criteria that
the court ought to consider in determining whether consent was voluntarily granted. Those
criteria include: First, the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officer; Second, the
absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; Third, a mere request to search; Fourth,
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cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and Fifth, the absence of deception or trick on the part
of the officer." Id.
In this case, Trooper Wilson complied completely with the standards set forth in
Whittenback. He used no claim of authority to search, he exhibited no force. Furthermore, his
request was a mere request to search the vehicle. The owner of the vehicle cooperated with him.
The officer did nothing to trick or deceive the owner. In fact, the officer promised the defendant
that he would not search the vehicle unless he found something evidencing marijuana in the front
of the vehicle.
When Trooper Wilson found the small pieces of marijuana in the vehicle, he then had
probable cause to search the remaining portion of the vehicle. The fact that the pieces of
marijuana were small is immaterial. Officer Wilson testified that he is an officer of over twenty
years and that he is very familiar with marijuana. As the Supreme Court held in State vs. Dorsey,
731 P.2d 1085 (Utah, 1985). The question of the legality of a detention or search depends on the
objective facts in light of the officer's training and experience. Id. Officer Wilson was
competent to tell that the smallfragmentswere marijuana - therefore, he had probable cause.
CONCLUSION
For the reason that the trooper had a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, that his
extended detention was lawful, and that the defendant consented to a search of the vehicle, the
defendant's Motion to Suppress ought to be denied.

6

Dated this

0 ^

day of May, 1998.

EteVufO. Leavitt
Juab County Attorney
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Suppress Evidence to Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Defendant, 43 East
200 North, P. O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603-0200 on this J>£^C day of May, 1998.
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David O. Leavitt, No. 5990
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (435) 623-1141
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
SUPPRESSION AND TO SUPPLEMENT
THE RECORD

vs.
CLARK ROY FRIESEN
HEATH C. SULTAN,

Criminal No. 971400205
971400204

Defendants.
The State of Utah, through the Juab County Attorney, hereby moves this court to
reconsider its decision that the trooper's stop was conducted without reasonable suspicion. The
State still asserts that the officer's main duty is to enforce Utah law and not a Wyoming statute.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle
because he merely assumed that Wyoming required two license plates. That assumption was
based upon his 24 years of experience on the Utah Highway Patrol and that he had seen
Wyoming vehicles with two license plates on prior occasions. In fact, Wyoming law does
prohibit operating a motor vehicle without two license plates. Wyoming Statutes Annotated 31I

2-205 states: "(a) license plates for vehicles shall be: (1) conspicuously displayed and securely
fastened to be plainly visible; (a) one on thefrontof the vehicle, excluding motorcycles, trailers,
and vehicles operated with dealer or manufacturer's license, (b) one on the rear of the vehicle."
The Court ought not require a police officer to have absolute certainty of every law in
every state when he observes what he reasonably believes is a law violation.
For that reason, the State requests that the Court reconsider it ruling on the suppression
hearing and it augments the file of Wyoming statute, prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle
without a securely fashioned front license plate.
Dated this

fclT^

day of June, 1998.

D--.R/. -d-

David O. Leavitt
Juab County Attorney

I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration of
Suppression and to Supplement the Record to Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Clark Friesen, 43
East 200 North, P. O. Box L, Provo, Utah 84603-0200 and Milton T. Harmon, Attorney for
Heath C. Sultan, 36 South Main, Nephi, Utah 84648 on this J9+h day of June, 1998.

BY COMsrtJJt//
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David O. Leavitt, No. 5990
Juab County Attorney
146 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (435) 623-1141

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
STIPULATION AS TO
WYOMING LAW

Plaintiff,

Criminal No. 971400205
971400240

vs.
CLARK ROY FRIESEN
HEATH C. SULTAN,
Defendants.

Michael D. Esplin, counsel for the defense in this case, hereby stipulates that Wyoming
statute 31-2-205 of Wyoming Statutes Annotated prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle
without a securely fastened front license plate.
Dated this

day of June, 1998.

Michael D. Esplin
Attorney for Defendants
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR ' ' •
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JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ' ^ " '
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 971400205

vs.
CLARK ROY FRIESEN,
Defendant.

Suppression Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
February 26, 1998
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING. JR.
Fourth District Court Judge
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:

DAVID O. LEAVITT
125 North Main
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: (801)623-1141

For the Defendant:

MICHAEL P. ESPLIN
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)373-4912

Transcribed by Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT
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BEVERLY LOWE
1641 South 350 West
Orem, Utah 84058
Telephone: (801)225-0234

Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court
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PROCEEDINGS

2

(Electronically Recorded on February 26,1998).

3

(Recording started; hearing already in progress),

4

CHARLIE RAY WILSON.

5

having been called and sworn

6

testifies as follows:

7

DIRECT EXAMINATION

8

BY MR. LEAVITT:

9

Q.

— drug intradiction?

10

A.

Yes. I have.

11

Q.

Can you tell me what some of that is?

12

A.

The first basic training was in POST that all police officers

13

go through. And just throughout the years, as my experience as a

14

trooper. I've had the opportunity with guys that have done a lot in that

15

field and it's just an ongoing experience and learning.

16

Q.

Have you ever seen marijuana on the job?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

How many times?

19

A.

I don't know the number of times. Probably hundreds of

21

Q.

Uh-huh. Have you ever smelled it?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

An estimation as to how many times that would be?

24

A.

It would be in the hundreds of times.

25

Q.

Okay. Are you familiar with the events of the day of

20

times.
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October 20th, 1997?

2

A.

Yes. I am.

3

Q.

On that date, did you have occasion to come in contact

4

with the defendant in this case, Mr. Friesen?

5

A.

I did.

6

Q.

Tell me how that occurred.

7

A.

Okay. I was assigned to work Juab County. We were

8

south at Nephi. I observed a vehicle going northbound. At this point, I

9

still can't remember if I was stationary or moving. It seems like I was in

10

the turn-around. I did not see a front license plate on that vehicle when

11

it went by me.

12

Q.

Why does that concern you, officer?

13

A.

In Utah, you're issued two license plates and it's

14

something that we stop on. There's numerous reasons you'd stop on

15

that. Sometimes if the vehicle only has one license plate, they're only

16

displaying one, it's a possibility it could be a stolen vehicle, and other

17

reasons.

18

Q.

Uh-huh. Do you stop out-of-state vehicle for no front

20

A.

I do when I know that they require two license plates.

21

Q.

Okay. Was it a Wyoming plate?

22

A.

It was a Wyoming license plate. Yes.

23

Q.

Were you familiar with Wyoming law?

24

A.

I know that they issue two license plates.

25

Q.

Okay. What happened when you stopped the vehicle?

19

plate?

-51

A.

As I recall, I drove up past the vehicle to see if it did in fact

2

have a front license plate. I couldn't see one displayed. The front of

3

the bumper and grill had been broken where a license plate would go.

4

I stopped the vehicle. I approached the vehicle and I did

5

not see that they had a front license plate on the dash until I had

6

walked up there to talk to the driver.

7

Q.

Who was the driver?

8

A.

I believe it was Mr. Friesen, but I've got to check my

Q.

This defendant? In your reports, do you note the person

9
10
11

notes.

in your report is the driver?

12

A.

Just a second. Yes.

13

Q.

Can you tell me who you believe was the driver in that, if

14

that refreshes your recollection at all?

15

A.

Clark Friesen was the driver.

16

Q.

He was the driver?

17

A.

I'm sorry?

18

Q.

Who was the driver of the vehicle?

19

A.

Mr. Clark Friesen.

20

MR. LEAVITT: May I approach the witness, your Honor?

21

THE COURT: You may.

22

Q.

23

vehicle?

24

A.

25

BY MR. LEAVITT: Mr. Friesen was the driver of the

To the best of my recollection, it's him that I issued the

warning to, improper license display to.
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2

Q.

Thank you. What happened when you got up to Mr.

Friesen's window?

3

A.

I observed the front license plate or a license plate laying

4

on the dash. I talked to them about it. I noticed that there was what

5

appeared to be possibly juniper or cedar branches and sagebrush

6

hanging from the mirror. At that time, I thought I was picking up an odor

7

of marijuana.

8

Q.

Could you tell whether it was a burnt or a raw smell or

10

A.

I couldn't tell.

11

Q.

Was it a strong odor or a faint odor?

12

A.

There was different odors in the vehicle and I just thought

9

not?

13

that I was picking up an odor of marijuana. And looking at the sage and

14

cedar hanging from the rearview mirror, this in my experience, people

15

have put stuff like that to mask the odor of different odors.

16

Q.

How many times have you seen sage or juniper in a car?

17

A.

Several times.

18

Q.

Have any of those times had marijuana?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

They had marijuana in the car?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Have any of them not had marijuana?

23

A.

To the best of my recollection, no.

24

Q.

Every one of them had marijuana?

25

A.

To the best of my recollection. The latest was a stop that
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I assisted Sergeant Mangelson on and they had sagebrush and what

2

appeared to be cedar branches in the vehicle.

3

Q.

Are you familiar with the smell of sage and juniper?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

How?

6

A.

Just my experience dealing with it and being out in the

7
8
9

country.
Q.

Are you able to distinguish the difference between the

smell of sage and juniper versus marijuana?

10

A.

I believe so.

11

Q.

Were the smells that you were smelling distinctly that of

12

marijuana?

13

A.

I believed it to be marijuana. Yes.

14

Q.

All right. At that point, officer, did the purpose for your

15

stop change?

16

A.

I became suspicious of the possibility of that, with what I

17

had witnessed.

18

Q.

Uh-huh. What did you do then?

19

A.

I brought the driver back to my vehicle.

20

Q.

Mr. Friesen?

21

A.

To the best of my recollection, it was Mr. Friesen.

22

Q.

All right. Go ahead.

23

A.

And I told him about the stop. I told him that because he

24

was out of state, that I would just issue him a warning for improper

25

license display. I don't know if they had recently wrecked on the trip.
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But, the reason for the license plate being on the dash was the fact that

2

the front plastic bumper where the license plate would be secured was

3

damaged.

4

Q.

Uh-huh. Who was the registered owner of the car?

5

A.

It's an individual out of Wyoming. The passenger, Mr.

6
7

Sultan, had permission to take the vehicle.
Q.

So, Mr. Sultan was the person who had borrowed the

8

vehicle?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

What else happened when you got back in your vehicle?

11

A.

Because of the odor that I believed that I was smelling, I

12
13
14
15

asked for consent search to take a look in the vehicle.
Q.

Can you tell me specifically what you said to the

defendant?
A.

I can't tell you exactly. But it was that I would like to look

16

in the front part of his vehicle. If I did not find any evidence of

17

marijuana there, I would restrain my search to the front part of the

18

vehicle, but if I found anything, then I would search the vehicle.

19
20

Q.

All right. What was his response? Let me back up and

ask you. Did he appear to understand you?

21

A.

I believe he did.

22

Q.

Did you say this in a threatening way at all?

23

A.

I don't think I was.

24

Q.

All right. Did he consent?

25

A.

He did.
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1

Q.

What did he say?

2

A.

He just gave me consent to look in the front part of the

3

vehicle.

4

Q.

Did he hesitate at all?

5

A.

May 1 refer to my -

6

Q.

Sure.

7

A.

He hesitated and said, "If you have to."

8

Q.

Okay. What happened after that, officer?

9

A.

1 finished writing the driver his warning citation.

10

Q.

Okay. And then what did you do?

11

A.

1 gave back his information to him: his registration and

12

driver's license.

13

Q.

14

All right. Did you approach the passenger, Mr. Sultan, at

this point?

15

A.

Yes. Idid.

16

Q.

And what did you say to him?

17

A.

1 informed him that 1 believed that 1 could smell an odor of

18

marijuana coming from the vehicle. And 1 told him that the driver had

19

given me consent to check in the front seat area of the vehicle and

20

asked him if that was okay with him.

21

Q.

What was his response?

22

A.

He said yes.

23

Q.

All right. Did you have him exit the vehicle?

24

A.

Yes. Idid.

25

Q.

And did you do a weapon's pat down?
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A.

I did.

2

Q.

And then what did you do after that, officer?

3

A.

I made a quick check through the front area of the vehicle.

4

Q.

Did you find anything in the front part of the vehicle that

5

made you suspicious that there was marijuana in the car?

6

A.

7

marijuana seed.

8

Q.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

I did. I found what appeared to be the outer shell of a

Now, describe what that is, what the outer shell of a

marijuana seed is.
A.

It's the rounded husk of a seed. Some seeds don't have a

husk, but this has kind of a shell on the outside of the seed.
Q.

And what made you believe that that was a marijuana

husk or marijuana seed?
A

In my experience over the years in searching various

vehicles, you tend to find a lot of little marijuana residue like that, litter.
Q.

Have you found marijuana seeds or husks of this sort

before?

18

A.

Yes. I have.

19

Q.

Prior to the 20th of October of 1997, do you have an

20

estimate as to how many times you may have seen those?

21

A.

The seeds and the husks, probably in the hundreds.

22

Q.

Uh-huh. When you saw it, was it something that looked

23

familiar to you?

24

A.

25

It appeared to me to look like the shell of a marijuana

seed, the outer husk.
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Q.

Now, is this something that's a large item or a small one?

2

A.

It's very small. Possibly as big around as say a BB for a

3

BB gun.

4

Q.

Uh-huh.

5

A.

But this was just the outer shell of that.

6

Q.

Okay. And what did you do when you found that, officer?

7

A.

I can't remember if I showed it to them right at that time. I

8

showed it to the guys.

9

Q.

Now, where did you find that specifically?

10

A.

Okay. I found what appeared to be the husks of two

11

seeds. The first one I found was in the right front in the carpet. The

12

second one was at the left side of the driver's side down between the

13

frame and the door seat.

14

Q.

15

on the left side?

16

A.

17
18

Okay. So, you found two, one on the right side and one

Yes. The first one I found was on the right side. The

second one was on the left side.
Q.

All right. When you showed these two seeds or husks

19

to the suspects at this point, did you tell them that you felt like you had

20

found marijuana?

21

A.

Yes. I did.

22

Q.

Or something indicating marijuana?

23

A.

Yes.

24-

Q.

And did you tell them that you were going to check the

25

rest of the vehicle?

-121

A.

Yes. I did.

2

Q

What happened after that?

3

A.

I had the two individuals stand to the right front of the

4

vehicle. I had patted them down. I believe I patted them down when I

5

had the passenger get out of the vehicle. I just asked them to stand

6

there while I made the search. I told them that based on what I

7

believed was the marijuana seed residue, that I was going to search the

8

rest of the vehicle.

9

I continued to search. I went into the back seat and then

10

searched the back of the vehicle. The vehicle was a Ford Escort

11

wagon. So, the luggage was basically visible in the back when you

12

raised up the back trunk lid.

13

I searched through several items there.

14

Q.

Did you find any marijuana?

15

A.

I did.

16

Q.

What was it specifically that you found?

17

A.

There was three bags there. I searched the first two. The

18

third one, I asked what it was. I was told that it was dirty laundry.

19

Q.

And what did you find in the other?

20

A.

The third bag, which I was told was dirty laundry, the

21

first thing I did is I pushed on it. It was a very solid bag. It didn't feel

22

like laundry would feel. I found in it what appears to be marijuana

23

wrapped in clear cellophane. It was surrounded by detergent or

24

scented dryer sheets.

25

Q.

What was the weight on that? Do you know?
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A.

Approximately 12 pounds.

2

Q.

Did the 12 pounds of marijuana that you found

3

corroborate in your mind with this faint smell that you detected?

4
5

A,

Yes. Yes. It did. And it went along with the residue and

the sage and the juniper.

6

Q.

All right. Officer, I'm going to show you what's been

7

marked previously as Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1 and ask you if you'll

8

identify that exhibit for me.

9
10

A.

mirror. To me, it appears to be some sage and juniper.

11
12

Q.

A.

Q.

It's been in your possession since of 20th of October of

A.

Yes. It has.

1997?

17
18
19

I'm not a botanist, but it appears to be from a juniper tree

and it appears to be a type of sagebrush.

15

16

And I think you stated prior that you can distinguish the

difference between the smell of sage and juniper with marijuana?

13
14

Okay. This is what was hanging on the inside rearview

MR. LEAVITT: For the purpose of the suppression
hearing only, I would move to introduce Exhibit 1.

20

MR. ESPLIN: I have no objection.

21

THE COURT: 1 is received.

22

(Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence).

23

Q.

BY MR. LEAVITT: Now, officer, I'm handing you what's

24

been marked Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2 and I'll ask if you'll identify that for

25

me.
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2

A.

This is what I believe to be marijuana residue fragment. I

believe this dark one was found on the left side of the vehicle.

3

Q.

Now is that in the same form as when you originally found

5

A.

This one is. This was fragments.

6

Q.

Okay. And where did you find that?

7

A.

This was to the left in the carpet, the left side of the

4

8
9
10

it?

driver's seat.
Q.

All right. So, tell me what it is about Exhibit 2 that made

you believe that that was marijuana?

11

A.

It appeared to be burnt marijuana residue.

12

Q.

And what did you base that on?

13

A.

My experience over the years of observing it in various

14
15
16

states: burnt, raw, fresh.
Q.

Let me ask you some questions about your experience.

You've had 24 years of experience.

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Is that right?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

And in those 24 years, you've seen marijuana, you've said

21
22
23
24
25

on how many occasions?
A.

I haven't kept track. But it would have to be in the

hundreds of times.
Q.

Uh-huh. You felt fairly confident that what you were

seeing was marijuana. Is that right?

-15-

1

A.

I believed it to be. Yes.

2

Q.

Has it been in your possession since the day of the

3

offense?

4

A.

It has.

5

MR. LEAVITT: You've seen it, haven't you?

6

MR. ESPLIN: Well, I didn't have my microscope. But I

7

think there's something in there.

8

MR. LEAVITT: Okay.

9

MR. ESPLIN: Examining it with the naked eye, I can't

10

tell for sure.

11

MR. LEAVITT: I'll move to admit Exhibit 2, your Honor.

12

THE COURT: It will be received.

13
14
15
16

(Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence).
Q.

BY MR. LEAVITT: I'm now showing you what's been

marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 3 and ask you to identify that.
A.

This is the seed shell pod, skin, that was on the right

17

front in the carpet. When I found it, it was kind of in a half shell. And

18

putting it into the plastic, it just crushed because it's fragile.

19

Q.

20

the stop?

21

A.

22

So, it's in a different form now than it was on the date of

It doesn't have the rounded appearance that it had when

I pulled it out of the carpet.

23

Q.

Uh-huh. But you believe that to be a marijuana husk?

24

A.

I believe it to be a marijuana shell of the seed. In my

25

experience in searching vehicles, you find a lot of this residue. I don't
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know if it's just when they're making a joint, if it falls out, or if in smoking

2

it, the seeds pop and throw the shells. But I've found a lot of it in

3

various vehicles.

4

Q.

5

How many vehicles have you searched prior to October

20th of 1997, if I could have you venture an estimate?

6

A.

7

in the hundreds.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

They have been consent searches or searches based

10
11
12

I wouldn't want to guess. I would be maybe way off. It's

on probable cause?
Q.

Have you found on many occasions husks such as these

in the carpets of vehicles?

13

A.

I have.

14

Q.

Are you able to estimate how many times prior to the

15
16

date of this stop?
MR. ESPLIN: I object, your Honor. I think it calls for

17

speculation, number one. Number two, it's not relevant to this case,

18

whether or not this particular occasion.

19

THE COURT: Well, I'll sustain the objection.

20

MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, in State versus Poole, it goes

21

to the officer's training and experience. I think if the officer is able to

22

testify that he has seen these kinds of husks in the carpet of cars prior,

23

I think that goes to the -

24
25

THE COURT: Well, he's told us he has. But, he's also
told us that he just would be guessing.
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2

MR. LEAVITT: Well, that was on a number of searches of
cars, your Honor.

3

THE COURT: Well, okay. If he can.

4

MR. LEAVITT: If he can't answer it, I'll move it.

5

THE COURT: All right. I'll permit it then. Go ahead.

6

MR. LEAVITT: Thank you.

7

THE WITNESS: I can't give you an exact number. But it's

8

a highly reasonable number.

9
10

MR. ESPLIN: And I object to that last comment after "I
can't give you an exact number," and ask that it be stricken.

11

THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection to that then.

12

MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. Your Honor, we'd move to

13

introduce Exhibit 3 for the purpose of this hearing.

14

THE COURT: Any objection to 3?

15

MR. ESPLIN: No. No objection.

16

THE COURT: 3 is received.

17
18
19
20

Q.

BY MR. LEAVITT: Officer, why did you ask consent to

search?
A.

Because I became suspicious that there might be

marijuana.

21

MR. ESPLIN: Well, I object to that, your Honor, as to why

22

he did it. He can tell what he did. But as to his reasoning, that's not

23

before the Court. The Court is to determine whether or not based on

24

the facts he has a reasonable suspicion that there's contraband in the

25

vehicle.
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2

THE COURT: Well, I'll permit him to express what he
relied on to do so.

3

THE WITNESS: Could you ask me the question again?

4

Q.

BY MR. LEAVITT: Why did you ask consent to search?

5

A.

I became suspicious based on the odor that I believed

6

was an odor of marijuana. As I say though, it was hard to pick it out,

7

but it seemed like an odor of marijuana.

8
9

They did have the juniper and the sage hanging on the
mirror.

10

MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. That's all I have.

11

THE COURT: You may cross-examine.

12

MR. LEAVITT: I don't believe that the actual marijuana

13

that was found is relevant to this.

14

MR. ESPLIN: I'll get it.

15

MR. LEAVITT: (Inaudible).

16

MR. ESPLIN: No. That's fine. I'll get it.

17

MR. LEAVITT: Okay.

18
19
20

Q.

BY MR. LEAVITT: I'm showing you what's been marked

as Exhibit 4 and I'd ask you to identify that for me.
A.

This is the one that I was told had laundry in it. When I

21

pushed down on it, it was solid and not like clothing would be. When I

22

opened it up, this is what I saw. It was wrapped with the dryer sheets.

23

The dryer sheets was on the top of it.

24
25

I punched a small hole there and (inaudible) tested. It
tested positive for marijuana.
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Q.

Thank you. It's been in your possession -

2

A.

It has.

3

Q.

- since that day?

4

A.

Yes.

5

MR. LEAVITT: I'd move for the admission of Exhibit 4.

6

MR. ESPLIN: No objection.

7

THE COURT: It will be received. Don't put it up here by

8

me though. Marijuana really gives me a headache and I smelled it -

9

MR. ESPLIN: It has quite a strong odor, doesn't it, your

10

Honor?

11
12

THE COURT: - as soon as he carried the bag in.
(Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4 received into evidence).

13

MR. LEAVITT: Easily smelled. Yes. It is.

14

CROSS EXAMINATION

15

BY MR. ESPLIN:

16

Q.

Trooper Wilson, it's true that the sole reason you stopped

17

this vehicle is because you didn't see a front license plate on the

18

vehicle. Is that correct?

19

A.

Yes. I stopped the vehicle to check it. Like I say, Utah

20

issues two plates. We do stop vehicles on that. There are many

21

reasons why you stop.

22

Q.

I understand there might be other reasons, but the basis

23

and justification for your stopping the vehicle, doing a traffic stop, which

24

would be a level two encounter, turn your lights on, pulling the vehicle

25

over, was because there was no front license plate on the vehicle. Is
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that correct?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And it's true, is it not, once you got behind the vehicle you

4

could see that this vehicle that had a Wyoming license plate on the

5

vehicle?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Now, this was not a vehicle subject to the registration

8

requirements of the State of Utah, it not being a vehicle that was

9

registered in this state. Is that correct?

10

A.

Not subject to t h e -

11

Q.

Registration laws of the State of Utah.

12

MR. LEAVITT: Objection, your Honor. That calls for the

13

officer to give a legal opinion. I don't think that that's his purpose or his

14

expertise.

15

THE COURT: Well, I'll permit the question.

16

Q.

BY MR. ESPLIN: Okay. Let me rephrase the question

17

and make it a little easier. Was this vehicle then a vehicle which was

18

registered in the state of Utah?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Does the fact that it was not registered in the state of

21

Utah, does that make it illegal to travel on the roads of the state of

22

Utah?

23

A.

No.

24

Q.

And isn't it true that you did not know whether or not

25

Wyoming requires, even though they may issue two plates, whether or

-211

not they require a vehicle that's registered in Wyoming to display two

2

license plates, a front license and a back license plate?

3
4
5

A.

It's been my experience that all vehicles generally do

display the two license plates.
Q.

That's not my question. Listen to the question carefully.

6

The question is: Do you know whether or not it's a violation of the law

7

of the state of Wyoming that a vehicle that is issued two plates must

8

display both a front and a rear license plate?

9
10

MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I object. It's not relevant to
this proceeding.

11

MR. ESPLIN: It is relevant, your Honor.

12

THE COURT: I'll permit it. Go ahead.

13

THE WITNESS: You've got me confused here. What's

14
15

your point?
Q.

BY MR. ESPLIN: My question is this. Do you know that is

16

a violation of a law of the state of Wyoming for a vehicle which may be

17

issued two license plates to only display one rear plate?

18
19

A.

I do not know exactly if it is a violation of their law. I

assume it is.

20

Q.

You do not. The question is: You do not know that it is.

21

Is that correct?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And so the time you stopped this vehicle in Utah and it

24

didn't have a front license plate on it, you did not know whether or not

25

that was even a violation of the law of the state of Wyoming. Is that
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correct?

2

A.

I assumed it was a violation of the law. That's why I

3

stopped it. It is a violation in Utah if you're issued two license plates

4

not to display a —

5
6

Q.

Well, I understand the law in Utah. I'm talking about

Wyoming now. Did you know at that time?

7

A.

I assumed it was a violation of the law.

8

Q.

But you did not know?

9

A.

I assumed it.

10

Q.

Okay. This is a yes or no question. Did you know that it

11

was a violation of the law of the state of Wyoming not to display a front

12

plate?

13

A.

A violation of Wyoming law?

14

Q.

Yes.

15

A.

I did not. No.

16

Q.

Okay. Thank you. In fact, you do know from your

17

experience that there are such states that don't require that front

18

license plates be displayed. Is that correct?

19

A.

Correct.

20

Q.

And I take it your authority, as far as you understand it,

21

would extend to the enforcement of the Utah rules of the road and

22

particularly Utah registration requirements for vehicles? Would that be

23

fair to say?

24

A.

I don't understand what you're saying. Say it again.

25

Q.

Your authority as a peace officer would include enforcing
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the laws of the State of Utah relative to rules of the road and to enforce

2

Utah registration requirements. Is that fair to say?

3

A.

Enforce registration requirements? Yes.

4

Q.

Of the State of Utah, correct?

5

A.

Registration requirements.

6

Q.

Are you telling me that you have authority as a Utah

7

police officer to enforce registration requirements of another state, say

8

the State of Wyoming?

9

A.

As a police officer, I have the right to stop a vehicle that

10

does not have the registration. If that vehicles comes from another

11

state, then I guess I am enforcing that because they are required -

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

- to have their registration to be operated in this state.

14

Q.

This vehicle was registered, was it not?

15

A.

Registered in Wyoming.

16

Q.

And you found no problem with the registration, did you?

17

A.

To my recollection, no.

18

Q.

Well, your notes. Do you want to read your notes? Your

19

notes say the registration was okay. You found it was properly

20

registered. There was no problem with registration.

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

Was there?

23

A.

Yeah.

24

Q.

In fact, when you stopped the vehicle and you walked up

25

to the vehicle after observing that the front bumper had been damaged
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as you approached it, you then saw the front license plate displayed in

2

the window of the vehicle on the dashboard, did you not?

3

A.

I did.

4

Q.

Okay. And at that point then you knew, did you not, that

5

the vehicle at least had a front plate even if it wasn't displaying one,

6

correct?

7

A.

Correct.

8

Q.

So, what was your purpose from that point on to detain

9
10
11
12

the individuals that were in the vehicle?
A.

To check to make sure he had a valid driver's license. To

check for proof of insurance.
Q.

Did you have some reason to believe that the individual

13

driving the vehicle may not have a valid driver's license because the

14

front plate wasn't displayed?

15

A.

You lost me.

16

Q.

I said what about not having a front plate on the vehicle

17

made you believe that this individual may not have a valid driver's

18

license?

19

A.

20
21
22

I don't know. I just asked to see if he had a driver's

license.
Q.

Isn't it true at that point, since this was a Wyoming

vehicle, that you were going to stop and investigate for drugs?

23

A.

This was what?

24

Q.

Isn't it true that because this vehicle was a Wyoming

25

vehicle, and you had stopped the vehicle, you were now going to see
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2

if there were any drugs in the vehicle?
A-

As an officer of the State of Utah, I am sworn to uphold

3

all the laws. Any vehicle I stop, I am looking for anything that might

4

raise reasonable suspicion of any crime being committed.

5

Q.

So the answer would be yes?

6

A-

At the time I stopped the vehicle, I was looking at the

7

front license plate not being displayed.

8

Q.

Okay. And you saw the front license plate?

9

A.

When I walked up to the car.

10

CL

Okay. Now, from that point, once you knew there was a

11

front license plate to the vehicle and you could see why it wasn't on the

12

vehicle, because of the damage to the bumper, you knew that, right?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

From that point on, were you then focusing on determining

15
16
17
18

whether or not there were any drugs or contraband in that vehicle?
A-

At that time, I told him that I believe they needed to

display it. They had two plates.
Q.

That's not my question. My question was: At that point

19

did you make a determination that you were going to search that

20

vehicle or look in that vehicle to determine if there was any further

21

violations of law, such as the carrying of controlled substances?

22
23
24
25

A.

At that point, in my mind I am smelling the odors. "Now is

this marijuana I'm smelling?"
Q.

No. I'm talking before you even talked to the driver. I

mean, you've walked up. You're up at the vehicle. You see. As you
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walk up to the vehicle, if you will recall, you said you saw the license

2

plate and it was sitting on the dashboard. But at that point as far as the

3

reason you stopped the vehicle, you know that it has a front license

4

plate. I understand then at that point you don't have any reason to

5

believe that it's not registered properly based on what you've seen. Is

6

that correct?

7

A.

Not necessarily.

8

Q.

Did you look at the rear license plate as you were

9

following the vehicle?

10

A.

I did.

11

Q.

Did it have a bumper decal on the vehicle showing that

12

the license plate was current, the registration was current?

13

A.

The tag on that plate showed current.

14

Q.

Okay. What I'm saying, what at that point did you have,

15

what reasonable (inaudible) suspicion did you have that this driver was

16

violating any law at that point?

17

A.

At that point, I asked for the registration to verify that that

18

license plate actually belonged to that car. There's a lot of people that

19

put plates from other vehicles on cars, improper registration.

20
21

Q.

Did you have any reason to believe, any (inaudible)

reasonable suspicion that this car was a stolen car at that point?

22

A.

In the past, we have got cars that are just displaying -

23

Q.

I'm not talking about in the past. I said did you at that

24

point think this particular car - what about this particular car that led

25

you to believe this might be a stolen car?
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A.

The fact it didn't have the front plate displayed.

2

Q.

I'm talking about you've seen that the front plate is there,

3
4
5

you've seen that the front A.

The front plate wasn't mounted where I believed it should

be mounted.

6

Q.

Didn't you say there was damage to the front bumper?

7

A.

Yes. That's right.

8

Q.

Didn't that satisfy your curiosity as to why there wasn't

9
10
11
12

a front plate on there?
A.

I don't believe it did and I don't think it would satisfy

anybody's curiosity.
Q.

So, you're telling us then, Trooper Wilson, that you were

13

not then at that point focused on trying to determine whether or not

14

there was some other violation of the law that these individuals might

15

be involved in other than not just having a front plate on their vehicle?

16

A.

I'm trained when you approach a car, you're looking for

17

all aspects. And when you talk to the people, you're looking for all that

18

is there.

19

Q.

Okay. Now, you have indicated that at some point you

20

became suspicious of a possibility that there might be contraband. At

21

what point was that?

22

A.

At the point where I'm talking to the occupants where I'm

23

standing by the driver's side of the vehicle. At that point, I can see the

24

license plate on the dash.

25

Q.

Okay.
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2
3

A.

I can also see the juniper. I'm also getting what I believe

is an odor of marijuana.
Q.

I believe you testified earlier that you were not sure that

4

you were smelling marijuana because the smell is masked with other

5

smells?

6

A.

That's correct. It's kind of hard to identify it sometimes.

7

Q.

Okay. So, you weren't sure. You thought you possibly

8
9
10

smelled marijuana, correct?
A.

I thought I was smelling an odor that I believed was

marijuana.

11

Q.

That you thought might be?

12

A.

Possibly.

13

Q.

And did at that point ask to search the vehicle?

14

A.

I believe I got the driver in my vehicle and at that point

15
16
17

I told him of my suspicions.
Q.

Did you advise him of any Miranda rights he might have

at that point?

18

A.

No. I didn't.

19

Q.

Why not?

20

A.

He was not under arrest.

21

Q.

He was detained, was he not?

22

A.

He was detained in the scope of the traffic stop.

23

Q.

But, you had completed your traffic stop, hadn't you?

24

A.

I was writing him a warning citation for failure to display

25

a front license plate.
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2
3

Q.

Okay. And you had written him the warning citation.

Were you going to let him go at that point?
A.

I gave him back his material and asked him if I could take

4

a quick look there. Like I say, he kind of hesitated and said yes or "if

5

you have to" or something.

6
7
8
9
10
11

Q.

Did you tell him at that point that "I suspect that you've got

marijuana in the vehicle and I want to take a look."?
A.

I told him that I believed I was smelling the odor of

marijuana.
Q.

And did you tell him that he had a right not to give you any

information about that situation?

12

A.

I did not Mirandize him. No.

13

Q.

Did you tell him he was free at that point since you had

14

finished writing the traffic citation, that he was free to leave?

15

A.

I had given him back all of his information.

16

Q.

But did you tell him he was free to leave?

17

A.

I didn't say, "You're free to leave."

18

Q.

Had you turned off the overhead lights on your vehicle?

19

A.

I had the overhead lights on for traffic safety.

20

Q.

Okay. And the overhead traffic lights are a signal to stop

21

your vehicle (inaudible), are they not?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

And he didn't give a full blown consent exactly, did he?

24

said, "If you have to." Did you tell him, "Well, I don't have to. It's your

25

choice."?
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A.

I don't recall the full details there.

2

Q.

Well, it's true you didn't tell him he did not have to submit

3

to the search, isn't it?

4

A.

No. I did not tell him he did not have to submit to it.

5

Q.

The smell of marijuana that you claimed to have smelled,

6

you said you couldn't distinguish whether or not it was the smell of

7

burnt marijuana or fresh marijuana. Is that correct?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

They have a very distinctive different smell, don't they?

10

A.

They do at times. Yes.

11

Q.

Well, at anytime, don't they?

12

A.

Yeah. Burnt marijuana by itself smells and raw marijuana

13

by itself. But when you've mixed the two and then you have air

14

fresheners mixed with them and you have sagebrush and juniper -

15

Q.

I'm just talking about the two different smells.

16

A.

Yeah. If you h a d -

17

Q.

There's -

18

A.

— pure marijuana here, burnt marijuana over there, yes.

19
20

They do have different odors.
Q.

Okay. A long story short. You went ahead and with

21

whatever permission you thought you had or you obtained, you looked

22

in the front of the vehicle and you found these exhibits here, which you

23

immediately identified as being marijuana residue -

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

- or substance. No question in mind about it?
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A.

2

something else.

3

Q.

It could have been something else?

4

A.

It very easily could be.

5

Q.

But, you took it to be marijuana. At the time, you were not

6

sure that it was marijuana?

7
8

There's a possibility it may not be. It could be a seed of

A

It appeared to me to be the husk of it. It has not been

analyzed. It possibly could be just another seed husk.

9

Q.

And that's all you found at that point, correct?

10

A.

At that point. Yes.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

A.

Plus the odor.

13

Q.

Is it not true that you felt that whatever consent you had

14

was limited to searching the front seat of the vehicle?

15
16
17
18

A.

I believe I told them that I would just look in that front

Q.

So, at that point when you looked in the front, you were

part.

trying to justify searching the vehicle further, weren't you?

19

A.

I was looking in the vehicle to see what I could find.

20

Q.

And these items here like as small as that, it's possible

21

that they could be in a vehicle, have been there for weeks, months?

22

A.

It's a possibility.

23

Q.

Without the passenger or driver knowing whose they were

24
25

or even knowing they were there, correct?
A.

Correct.
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Q.

Now, to make a long story short, you did search the rear

2

of the vehicle. And is it true that you searched - you indicated that you

3

found some bags there, correct?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

And isn't it true that the two bags you searched had

6

clothes in them?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Personal possessions?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And isn't it also true that you searched the bag that Mr.

11

Friesen identified as being his bag and in that bag you found nothing

12

but legitimate items: clothes and other personal things?

13
14

A.

Yes. There was a pocketknife found that did appear to

have marijuana residue on it.

15

Q.

In whose bag?

16

A.

And I would have to look at my notes on that one and

17

probably on the back of my ticket notes. It might be in the inventory.

18

Q.

You found a black leather bag, correct?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Isn't that the bag that was identified as belonging to Mr.

21

Friesen, my client?

22

A.

I believe it is.

23

Q.

Wasn't it in the dark blue travel bag, a turquoise bag, that

24
25

you found the knife that had the marijuana residue on it?
A.

Is that what the report says?
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Q.

Well, I'm referring to your supplemental fact sheet,

2

evidence property seized. Halfway down it says: "Small travel, dark

3

blue bag with tan trim, red handled pocketknife and one small scale."

4

A.

Yes. That's correct.

5

Q.

Okay. And what's been received as State's Exhibit 4,

6

this bag was also found, correct?

7

A.

In the rear of the vehicle. Yes.

8

Q.

And did you find any clothing or identification attached to

9
10

that bag and connected with that bag, an indication it belonged to the
driver, Mr. Friesen?

11

A.

The name is on the tag and I forget which one of their

12

names is there.

13

Q.

Okay. I'll show you this tag her. And you're referring to

14

a Delta Airlines tag. Let me get it here so that the judge doesn't smell

15

this. Hold your nose, judge.

16

A.

Heath Sultan.

17

Q.

Heath Sultan. That would be the co-defendant, correct?

18

A.

Yes. Correct.

19

Q.

And isn't it true that in your conversation with Mr. Friesen,

20

he indicated to you that his bag was the leather bag and this was not

21

his bag?

22

A.

Yes.

23

MR. ESPLIN: That's all the questions I have.

24

THE COURT: Redirect, counsel?

25

///
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2
3
4
5

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LEAVITT:
Q.

Officer, how quickly after you've had the window rolled

down did you smell the odor of marijuana?
A.

Just initially when they rolled the window down, as I

6

reached or bent over to talk to them and then off and on during the

7

conversation.

8
9
10
11
12
13

Q.

The first moment that you smelled that marijuana, is that

when your traffic stop would have changed into a possible drug
investigation?
A.

When I become suspicious of the possibility of marijuana

there because I believed that's what I was smelling.
Q.

So, would it be safe to say then that after you determined

14

that they had a front plate, that you were not only looking for a bad

15

license but also suspicious about drugs at that point?

16

A.

Yes.

17

MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. Nothing further.

18

THE COURT: Anything else?

19

RECROSS EXAMINATION

20

BY MR. ESPLIN:

21

Q.

22
23
24
25

I thought I asked you the same question and you said that

you just wanted to check out the registration. That was wrong then?
A.

I believe what you said is that when I stopped that car, I

was looking for drugs.
Q.

I said, "After you stopped the car." My question was this.
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A.

Well, then I misunderstood.

2

Q.

Okay. Let me ask it again to make sure I'm clear. After

3

you stopped the car and you observed the rear license plate and saw

4

that it was properly registered and current, you walked up to the driver's

5

side of the vehicle, you saw the license plate on the front there, -

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

- my question is, at that point were you suspicious that

8

there was drugs or activity and going to check that out?

9

A.

I can't remember at what point they rolled the window

10

down, if they had rolled the window down prior to me seeing the license

11

plate.

12

Q.

But, you don't recall when that was?

13

A.

I walked up to the door, the individual. The window was

14

down and I see the license plate. This has all happened

15

simultaneously.

16

MR. ESPLIN: No further questions.

17

MR. LEAVITT: Nothing else, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: You may step down. You may call your

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

next witness.
MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, part of the defendant's motion
is to suppress based on a lack of nexus or connection to the drugs.
It's the State's view that that's a jury question or a
question of fact and it doesn't go to the suppression of evidence.
I've got the co-defendant in the case who is here and can
testify that Mr. Friesen was 100 percent part of the transaction if that's
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necessary for purposes of suppression. I don't believe that that's a

2

question for a suppression. I really think that's a jury question for them

3

to decide.

4
5

MR. ESPLIN: It's up to him what he wants to put on, your
Honor.

6

THE COURT: Well, I think you'd better put it on, counsel.

7

MR. LEAVITT: We'll call Heath Sultan, your Honor.

8

THE COURT: If you'll come forward, please. If you'll

9

raise your right hand, the clerk will administer an oath to you.

10

THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony

11

you are about to give in this case now pending before the court will be

12

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

13

THE WITNESS: Yes. I do.

14

THE COURT: Be seated in the witness chair, please.

15

MR. LEAVITT: Your Honor, I'd state for the record that

16

Mr. Sultan will be pleading guilty to the third degree felony of simple

17

possession of marijuana, that in the event that something were to

18

happen to this plea bargain, the State would not hold anything he says

19

today against him at the time of his trial.

20

THE COURT: All right.

21

HEATH JOHN SULTAN

22

having been called and sworn

23

testifies as follows:

24

///

25

///
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2

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. LEAVITT:

3

Q.

Please, tell us your name, sir.

4

A.

Heath John Sultan.

5

Q.

And do you know Clark Friesen?

6

A.

Yes. I do.

7

Q.

How?

8

A.

I met him in Jackson, Wyoming.

9

Q.

How long ago?

10

A.

I guess about a year ago.

11

Q.

What was the nature of your relationship?

12

A.

Friends.

13

Q.

Do you get together often?

14

A.

Whenever we just happen to shoot pool together and

15

whatnot.

16

Q.

17

Were you engaged in drug activity together up in

Wyoming?

18

A.

No.

19

Q.

Uh-huh. Did you go with him on a trip in October of 1997?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Can you tell me what the purpose of that trip was?

22

A.

To go to Arizona to meet up with a friend and purchase

23

marijuana.

24

Q.

Okay. Did Mr. Friesen go with you on the trip?

25

A.

Yes.
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Q.

Did he have any involvement in that transaction?

2

A.

Yes. He did.

3

Q.

Please, explain what that was.

4

A.

He wanted to share in the sale of the marijuana.

5

Q.

All right. When did he become aware the purpose of the

6

trip was to purchase marijuana?

7

A.

At the start of the trip?

8

Q.

At the start of the trip?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And was he present when you purchased the marijuana?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Who purchased it? You or him?

13

A.

We both did.

14

Q.

Okay. Did you use his money as well?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

How much did you pay for it?

17

A.

To tell you the truth, I can't quite recollect.

18

Q.

Do you recall the events of the day of your stop, October

19

the 20th, 1997?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Uh-huh. When you were stopped, do you recall the

22
23
24
25

officer telling you that he smelled marijuana?
A.

Yes. I do believe, but the odor was strictly cigarettes.

That's the fact of the matter.
Q.

But, there was a lot of marijuana in the Ford Escort. Is
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that right?

2

A.

Correct.

3

Q.

Uh-huh. And the raw marijuana in the bag, the odor

4
5

emanated inside the Ford Escort. Is that right?
A.

No. Actually at that time, it didn't. I think Trooper Wilson

6

has excellent perception of human characteristics and nervousness and

7

anxiety. I don't think he actually smelled any marijuana at all.

8

Q.

Uh-huh. Now, did he ask consent to search?

9

A.

He asked Clark. He didn't ask me. He told me that he

10

had gotten consent to search from Clark and then he wanted to search

11

the vehicle. I never gave consent to search the vehicle.

12

MR. LEAVITT: Thank you. That's all I have.

13

THE COURT: Mr. Esplin?

14

CROSS EXAMINATION

15

BY MR. ESPLIN:

16

Q.

17

You indicated that you went to meet up with a friend down

in Arizona. Is that correct?

18

A.

Yes, sir.

19

Q.

Was that your friend?

20

A.

Yes, sir.

21

Q.

And what's his name?

22

A.

Jeremy allegedly.

23

Q.

Pardon?

24

A.

Allegedly his name is Jeremy. I met someone down there.

25

If he told me his name was Jeremy, I'd take his word for it. But his
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name is Jeremy.

2

Q.

You don't know the last name?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

Had you met this individual before?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And so you had been down there before?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

How many occasions have you gone down to Arizona?

9

A.

Twice.

10

Q.

And was this the second time or the third time?

11

A.

This was the third time.

12

Q.

Third time. Isn't it true that while you were there, you had

13

money wired down to you to purchase the marijuana?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

And do you recall how much money was wired to you?

16

A.

No.

17

Q.

Who wired that money to you?

18

A.

A friend of mine.

19

Q.

What's his name?

20

A.

I don't recollect.

21

Q.

You don't remember his name?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

He's not that good of a friend?

24

A.

Not anymore. I haven't talked to anyone in Jackson since

25

I left there and honestly I don't remember.
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Q.

Did he have a first name?

2

A.

Yes. I'm sure he has a first name.

3

Q.

But you don't even remember his first name?

4

A.

No. I don't.

5

Q.

How much money did this individual wire down to you?

6

A.

I don't recollect. I think most of it was actually for

7

traveling expenses. I don't think it was to purchase marijuana.

8

Q.

But you don't remember?

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

How did you contact this Jeremy?

11

A.

I paged him.

12

Q.

You had his pager number?

13

A.

Uh-huh.

14

Q.

How much money did Mr. Friesen give you?

15

A.

I don't recollect.

16

Q.

You know he gave you some money?

17

A.

Yes. It was a hodgepodge of money that was given to me

18

by other people in Jackson and that's the reason I don't recollect who

19

sent me what money and who it was or how much money Clark put in.

20

It wasn't like a big drug deal where I'm going to go get a bunch of pot

21

and be the big dealer. It was a bunch of people who wanted to get

22

marijuana for their own personal use and were kind of donating money

23

to get this and we were bringing it back.

24
25

Q.

You were kind of the guy who was gathering the money

up. Is that correct?
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A.

Yeah. It was my connection. Yes.

2

Q.

Clark didn't have any connection down there?

3

A.

No.

4

Q.

And this vehicle that you were riding in, the Ford vehicle?

5

A.

Uh-huh.

6

Q.

That was one that you had borrowed?

7

A.

Correct.

8

Q.

Had you smoked any marijuana in that vehicle on that

10

A.

Absolutely not.

11

Q.

When you say that the trooper smelled marijuana, when

9

12
13

trip?

he said he smelled marijuana, you doubt that it did?
A.

I think it's impossible that he smelled marijuana because

14

I the entire trip had checked to see if the car smelled like marijuana and

15

I didn't smell anything whatsoever and I've smoked pot since I was four

16

years old. So, I'm pretty familiar with the smell.

17

Q.

You're kind of familiar with it?

18

A.

Yeah.

19
20

MR. ESPLIN: That's all the questions I have of this
witness.

21

MR. LEAVITT: Nothing further.

22

THE COURT: You may step down.

23

MR. LEAVITT: The State rests, your Honor.

24

MR. ESPLIN: I do have one more question, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: Okay.
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Q.

BY MR. ESPLIN: Is this your bag?

2

A.

Yes.

3

MR. ESPLIN: No further questions.

4

MR. LEAVITT: The record ought to reflect that the

5

question referred to Exhibit 4, your Honor.

6

MR. ESPLIN: Yes. Sorry about that.

7

THE COURT: It may.

8

Okay. Mr. Esplin, any witnesses?

9

MR. ESPLIN: We don't intend to call any witnesses at

10

this time, your Honor.

H
12

THE COURT: Very well then. Any argument or do you
wish to submit it on written memorandum?

13

MR. ESPLIN: I think I would like to submit it in brief, your

14

Honor. I think it's an issue of (inaudible) jurisdiction. I think it needs to

15

be addressed.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MR. ESPLIN: I would like to address one issue as far as

18

the time on that, your Honor.
We do have a trial date set in this matter for the 23rd of

19
20

March.

21

I have a conflict on that date that is fairly significant to me.

22

It's more significant to my wife because she has high anxiety and takes

23

Valium when she leaves and I usually have to fly to guide her on and

24

off the plane. So, I would request that the Court maybe wait until the

25

ruling on the motions and then reset the matter if necessary for trial
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depending on what the ruling is.

2

THE COURT: Any objection to that?

3

MR. LEAVITT: No.

4

THE COURT: All right. The trial date will be vacated and

5

to be reset if necessary upon the Court's ruling and the suppression

6

motion.

7

How long do you need to get your memorandum in?

8

MR. ESPLIN: I could submit mine by the 13th, about two

9

weeks, your Honor, is that's appropriate.

10

THE COURT: Okay. The 13th of March.

11

MR. LEAVITT: Can I have two weeks after that, your

12

Honor?

13

THE COURT: All right. That would be the 27th of March.

14

All right. If you'll have them in and then as soon as - b e

15

sure you courtesy copy me so that I get them in Provo.

16

MR. ESPLIN: Okay.

17

THE COURT: Okay.

18

MR. ESPLIN: Thank you, your Honor.

19

MR. LEAVITT: May we withdraw the exhibits, your

20
21
22
23
24
25

Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, please. Especially the one. You've
given me a headache now for the rest of the day.
oOo
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Addendum D

UARMA(JL^SMITH, Clerk
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Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
HBTAfTCOUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 971400205
DATE: June 2,1998

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

CLARK ROY FRIESEN,

LAW CLERK: David SturgUl
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having
received and considered the Motion and a supporting memorandum, the Court hereby grants the
Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision.
Statement of Facts
On or about October 20, 1997, UHP officer Charlie Wilson observed Defendant
traveling northbound on 1-15. The officer noticed Defendant's vehicle did not have afrontlicense
plate, and decided to pull Defendant over. Before the officer signaled to Defendant to stop, he
observed a Wyoming license plate displayed on the rear bumper of Defendant's vehicle.
The officer testified at the preliminary hearing that the only reason he stopped
Defendant was because of the missingfrontplate. He testified that he knew some states did not
require afrontlicense plate, but was not sure of the Wyoming requirement. The officer testified
that he "assumed" Wyoming required two license plates since he had seen other Wyoming cars
display bothfrontand rear plates.
The officer made contact with Defendant and was provided a valid driver's license and
vehicle registration. At that point, the officer testified that he detected the odor of marijuana.
The officer asked Defendant for consent to search his vehicle, to which Defendant reluctantly
responded "if you have to." The search eventually produced a 12 pound bag of marijuana.

60

Opinion of the Court
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "therightof the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated [.]" U.S. CONST, amend IV; see also UTAH CONST, art. I, §
12. The concern of the Fourth Amendment is against Unreasonable" or unjustified searches and
seizures--"reasonable" searches and seizures are constitutionally valid. Although the expectation
of privacy in a vehicle is less than that of a home, "one does not lose the protection of the Fourth
Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989).
In Utah, a peace officer may stop and question a person, without violating the Fourth
Amendment, "when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is,
or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994)

{quotingUnited States v, Place, 462 U.S. 696,702-.03 (1983)).
In this case, Officer Wilson testified at the preliminary hearing that the only reason he
stopped Defendant was because of the missingfrontlicense plate. He admitted that he wasn't
sure whether vehicles registered in Wyoming were required to display front plates. He "assumed"
they were because he had observed other Wyoming vehicles withfrontplates. The officer's
"assumption" does not support a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in criminal
activity. A number of lawful reasons could have existed to explain the absence of afrontplateone being that Wyoming law does not require them.
The State cites Utah Code Annotated § 41-1A-1305. That section provides that it is a
Class "C" Misdemeanor for any person to "operate on any highway of this state any vehicle
required by law to be registered without having license plates or plate securely attached." The
State argues that the statute does not exempt vehicles licensed in other jurisdictions. Assuming
the State's interpretation of the statute is correct, that does not cure the officer's "assumption" of
Wyoming's license plate requirement. The officer noticed Defendant's vehicle was registered in
Wyoming before he pulled him over. At that time, the officer did not know whether Wyoming
vehicles were required to display bothfrontand rear license plates. Clearly, the officer cannot
enforce a law that he merely "assumed" existed. Officer Wilson should have discontinued his
pursuit of Defendant and allowed him to proceed without interruption.

2

The State claims "[c]learly the faint smell of marijuana gives rise to a reasonable
suspicion that there was marijuana in the car[.]" While this may have justified a further inquiry of
the driver after a valid stop, such articulable suspicion must be present at the time of the stop and
must be the reason for the stop. In this case, no reasonable or articulable suspicion existed to
justify the stop. Furthermore, the unjustified stop negates any subsequent consent to search
Defendant's vehicle.
The bag of marijuana discovered in Defendant's vehicle was derived by exploitation of
an impermissible stop. Because none of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply, the
evidence will be suppressed.

Order
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted.
DATED this ^

cc:

day of June, 1998.

David 0. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney
Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Defendant
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff, |

CASE NO. 971400205
DATE: August 18, 1998

vs.

1

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

CLARK ROY FRIESEN,

LAW CLERK: Dave Backman
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of
Suppression and to Supplement the Record. The Court sees no reason to reconsider the decision
to suppress evidence. Mr. Esplin's stipulation that Wyoming law requires afrontlicense plate has
no bearing on the Court's decision since it does not change the fact that the officer assumed and
did not know that Wyoming requires two license plates. Having received and considered the
Motion and the stipulation, the Court hereby denies the Motion.
DATED t h i s / / day of August, 1998.
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cc:

David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney
Michael D. Esplin, Attorney for Defendant

